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Abstract
The Telecare medicine information system (TMIS) is developed to
provide Telecare services to the remote user. A user can access remote
medical servers using internet without moving from his place. Al-
though remote user and server exchange their messages/data via pub-
lic networks. An adversary is considered to be enough powerful that
he may have full control over the public network. This makes these
Telecare services vulnerable to attacks. To ensure secure communica-
tion between the user and server many password based authentication
schemes have been proposed. In 2013, Hao et al. presented chaotic
maps-based password authentication scheme for TMIS. Recently, Lee
identified that Hao et al.’s scheme fails to satisfy key agreement prop-
erty, such that a malicious server can predetermine the session key.
Lee also presented an efficient chaotic map-based password authenti-
cation and key agreement scheme using Smart cards for TMIS. In this
article, we briefly review Lee’s scheme and demonstrates the weakness
of Lee’s scheme. The study shows that the Lee’s scheme inefficiency of
password change phase causes denial of service attack and login phase
results extra computation and communication overhead.
keywords: Telecare medicine information system; Smart card; Password
based authentication; Cryptanalysis.
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1 Introduction
The advancement in network technology presented and salable platform for
online services. These services offer the access of server to the remote user
anytime and anywhere. Telecare medicine information systems (TMIS) are
also an online healthcare service in which a patient/user can access remote
medical servers. In Telecare services a remote user access the medical server
via public network (Internet). An adversary may have full control over the
public network, such that he can intercept, modify, delete, replay and record
the messages [3, 32]. This makes these services vulnerable to various kinds
of attack. The vulnerability of Telecare services causes a serious threat to
data security and integrity. Moreover, user privacy is always at the risk in
these services.
The adoption of authentication protocol can reduce the security risk [13,
1], as a remote user and the server can authenticate each other and establish
an establish a secure session. In recent years many smart card based au-
thentication protocols have been proposed to ensure authorized medical ser-
vice [2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 9, 11, 17, 15, 18, 20, 23, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34].
In these smart card based protocols user and server authenticate each other
and establish a session key. The established session key is used for secure
data transmission.
In recent times may chaotic map-based remote user authentication scheme [14,
16, 21, 22, 28] have been proposed to enhance the security of mutual authen-
tication and session key agreement. In 2013, Guo and Chang [14] proposed
a password based authentication scheme using smart cards, which present
efficient solution for smart card based authentication. In 2013, Hao et al [15]
proposed a smart card based password authentication scheme for TMIS using
chaotic map theory. However, Lee [23] shows that a malicious participant
can predetermine the session key. This enables an adversary to control the
communication between user and server. Moreover, Lee proposed and im-
proved authentication scheme based on chaotic maps to ensure secure and
efficient communication between user and server in TMIS. Lee claimed that
his scheme is more suitable for practical TMIS. Unfortunately, Lee’s scheme
is vulnerable to password guessing attack and fails to present efficient login
and password change phase. The inefficiency of password change phase of
Lee’s scheme causes denial of service attack if a user changes his password
wrongly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief
review of Lee’s scheme. Section 3 demonstrates some flaws in Lee’s scheme.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
2 Review of Lin’s Scheme
In this section, we will present the review of Lee [23]. This is similar to the
discussion in article [23]. The Lee efficient chaotic maps-based authentication
scheme for Telecare medicine information system comprises the four phases,
which are as follows:
• Parameter generation phase
• Registration phase
• Authentication phase
• Password changes phase
2.1 Notations
Notation Descryption
S A trustworthy remote server
U User
ID Identity of U
PW Password of U
SC Smart Card of U
mk Masterkey
Ek(·) Symmetric key encryption algorithms
Dk(·) Symmetric key decryption algorithms
h(·) A one-way hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
h(·) A one-way hash function H : [−1, 1]→ {0, 1}l
⊕ XOR
|| String concatenation operation
∆T Valid time delay in message transmission
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2.2 Parameter generation phase
The server S chooses its master key mk and generates a random number
x ∈ (−∞,+∞). Then, S selects a one-way hash function h(·) and H(·),
and secure symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms Ek(·) and Dk(·),
respectively.
2.3 Registration Phase
A user can register his identity with server and achieve the smart card with
personalized security parameters as follows:
Step 1. U selects his identity ID, password PW and a random number b,
then computes W = h(PW ⊕ b) and sends (ID,W ) to S via secure
channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the registration request, S generates a random
number r, then computes IM1 = mk ⊕ r, IM2 = h(mk||r)⊕ ID, K =
h(ID||mk) and D1 = h(ID||mk) ⊕ h(PW ⊕ b). Then, S personalizes
U ’s smart card by embedding the parameters {IM1, IM2, D1, h(·)} and
provides the smart card to U via secure channel.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, U computes D2 = h(PW )⊕ b and
storesD2 into the smart card, i.e., smart card stores {IM1, IM2, D1, D2, h(·)}.
2.4 Authentication Phase
In this phase U and S authenticate each other and draw a session key as
follows:
Step 1. U inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs the
password PW . Then, U generates a random number u and com-
putes b = D2 ⊕ h(PW ), K = D1 ⊕ h(PW ||b) = h(ID||mk), Tu(K)
and X1 = h(K||IM1||IM2||Tu(K)||T1). Then, U sends the message
M1 = {IM1, IM2, Tu(K), X1, T1} to S.
Step 2. Upon receiving U ’s message < M1 > at time T2, S verifies T2−T1 ≤
∆t, where ∆t is the valid time delay in message transmission. If the
time delay in message transmission is invalid, it denies the request.
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Otherwise, S computes r′ = IM1 ⊕ mk, ID
′ = IM2 ⊕ h(mk||r
′) and
K ′ = h(ID||mk), then S verifies X1 =? h(K
′||IM1||IM2||Tu(K)||T1).
If verification does not hold, it terminates the session. Otherwise, S
generates two random numbers rnew and v, then computes IM
∗
1
=
mk ⊕ rnew, IM
∗
2
= h(mk||rnew) ⊕ ID
′, Tv(Tu(K)) and Tv(K
′). Then,
S computes the following values:
sk = H(Tu(K), Tv(K
′), Tv(Tu(K)))
Y1 = IM
∗
1
⊕ h(sk||T2)
Y2 = IM
∗
2
⊕ h(sk||T2)
Y3 = h(sk||IM
∗
1
||IM∗
2
||Tv(K
′)||T2).
Finally, S sends the message M2 = {Y1, Y2, Y3, Tv(K
′), T2} to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving S’s message < M2 > at time T3, U verifies T3 −
T ′
2
≤ ∆t. If verification fails, it terminates the session. Otherwise, U
computes the following values
sk′ = H(Tu(K), Tv(K
′), Tu(Tv(K
′)))
IM∗
1
= Y1 ⊕ h(sk
′||T2)
IM∗
2
= Y2 ⊕ h(sk
′||T2).
Then, U verifies Y3 =? h(sk
′||IM∗
1
||IM∗
2
||Tv(K
′)||T2). If verification
does not hold, it terminates the session. Otherwise, U replaces IM1
with IM∗
1
and IM2 with IM
∗
2
.
2.5 Password Change Phase
Any legal user U can change the password by adopting the following steps:
Step 1. U insert his smart card into the card reader and inputs his old
password PW and new password PWnew into the smart card.
Step 2. The smart card computes b = D2⊕h(PW ), D
′
1
= D1⊕h(PW ||b)⊕
h(PWnew||b) and D
′
2
= h(PWnew)⊕ b.
Step 3. The smart card replaces D1 with D
′
1
and D2 with D
′
2
.
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3 Analysis of Lee’s Scheme
In this section, we point out the flaws in Lee’s scheme.
3.1 Off-line password guessing attack
The password guessing attacks are possible due to the following assumptions,
which are discussed in various articles [4, 3, 12, 19, 25, 32]:
• In general, the user selects the passwords, which he can easily remember
without storing, as long and complex passwords are usually difficult to
remember and need to store. In addition, If a user selects a long and
complex password and if he forget the password, he cannot use the
smart card. To avoid these difficulties, user chooses easily to remember
password, which belong to a finite set.
• An adversary can extract the information from the smart card, i.e., an
adversary can achieve {IM1, IM2, D1, D2, h(·)} from the smart card.
• An adversary is able to eavesdrop and intercept all the messages be-
tween user and server, i.e, he can interceptM1 = {IM1, IM2, Tu(K), X1, T1}
and M2 = {Y1, Y2, Y3, Tv(K
′), T2}, and record them.
With the above mentioned assumptions, a passive adversary can perform
the password guessing attack as follows:
Step 1. Guess the value PW ∗ and compute b∗ = D2 ⊕ h(PW
∗) and K∗ =
D1 ⊕ h(PW
∗||b∗).
Step 2. Verify X1 =? h(K
∗||IM1||IM2||Tu(K)||T1).
Step 3. If the verification succeeds, the password guessing succeeds. Oth-
erwise, repeat Step 1 and Step 2.
3.2 Inefficient login phase:
A smart card based authentication scheme should be able to identify incor-
rect input so that extra communication and computation overhead can be
avoided, as a user can input incorrect input due to mistake. However, the
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smart card does not very the correctness of input in Lee’s scheme and exe-
cutes the authentication session without verifying the correctness of input.
This can be justified as follows:
If user inputs incorrect password PW ∗. Then without verifying the input,
the smart card executes the login phase as follows:
• U inserts his smart card into the card reader and incorrect password
PW ∗.
• The smart card executes the session without verifying the input. It
generates a random number u and computes b∗ = D2⊕h(PW
∗), K∗ =
D1 ⊕ h(PW
∗||b∗) 6= K, as h(PW ||b) 6= h(PW ∗||b∗).
• The smart card also computes Tu(K
∗) andX∗
1
= h(K∗||IM1||IM2||Tu(K
∗)||T1),
then sends the message M∗
1
= {IM1, IM2, Tu(K
∗), X∗
1
, T1} to S.
• Upon receiving the message < M∗
1
> at time T2, S verifies T2 − T1 ≤
∆t. The verification holds, as user usage current timestamp. Then, S
computes r′ = IM1⊕mk, ID
′ = IM2⊕h(mk||r
′) and K ′ = h(ID||mk),
then S verifies X∗
1
=? h(K ′||IM1||IM2||Tu(K
∗)||T1). The verification
does not hold, as K 6= K∗. Therefore, S terminates the session.
The inefficiency of smart card to verify the correctness of the input pass-
word causes extra computation overhead. If Th, Tch and TX denote the time
complexity of hash function, Chebyshev chaotic maps operation and XOR
operation, respectively, then the computational overheads are 4TX+6Th+Tch.
The Guo and Chang [14] and Hao et al. [15] scheme also do not verify the
correctness of input and execute the session in case of wrong input. Therefore,
both the schemes [14, 15] also suffer this problem.
3.3 Inefficient password change phase
The smart card based scheme should verify the correctness during password
change. However, In Lee’s scheme, the smart card executes the password
change request without verifying the correctness of input. A user may enter
a wrong password, as human may sometimes forget the password or commit
some mistake. This may cause the denial of service attack where a user
cannot establish authorized session using the same smart card. This can be
seen as follows:
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• If user inputs new password PWnew and incorrect old password PW
∗
instead of PW where PW ∗ 6= PW , the smart card does not verify the
correctness of input.
• Step 2. The smart card computes b∗ = D2 ⊕ h(PW
∗), D∗
1
= D1 ⊕
h(PW ∗||b∗)⊕ h(PWnew||b
∗) and D∗
2
= h(PWnew)⊕ b
∗.
• Step 3. The smart card replaces D1 with D
∗
1
and D2 with D
∗
2
.
The smart card inability of wrong password detection causes denial of
service attack, which is clear from the following points:
• U inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs the new pass-
word PWnew. Then, U generates a random number u and computes
the following values
b∗ = D∗
2
⊕ h(PWnew)
= h(PWnew)⊕ b
∗h(PWnew)
= h(PW )⊕ b⊕ h(PW ∗) 6= b, as h(PW ) 6= h(PW ∗)
K ′ = D∗
1
⊕ h(PWnew||b
∗)
= D1 ⊕ h(PW
∗||b∗)⊕ h(PWnew||b
∗)⊕ h(PWnew||b
∗)
= D1 ⊕ h(PW
∗||b∗)
= K ⊕ h(PW ||b)⊕ h(PW ∗||b∗) 6= K, as h(PW ||b) 6= h(PW ∗||b∗)
The smart card computes Tu(K
∗) andX∗
1
= h(K∗||IM1||IM2||Tu(K
∗)||T1)
and sends the message M∗
1
= {IM1, IM2, Tu(K
∗), X∗
1
, T1} to S.
• Step 2. Upon receiving the message < M1 > at time T2, S verifies
T2 − T1 ≤ ∆t. The verification holds, as the user use current times-
tamp. Then, S computes r′ = IM1 ⊕mk, ID
′ = IM2 ⊕ h(mk||r
′) and
K ′ = h(ID′||mk). S verifies X∗
1
=? h(K ′||IM1||IM2||Tu(K
∗)||T1). The
verification does not hold, as K ′ 6= K∗
This shows a user cannot login to the server if he did mistake in password
change phase.
Hao et al. [15] scheme also does not verify the correctness of input in
password change phase and executes the session in case of any password in-
put. This shows that Hao et al. [15] also does not maintain efficient password
change phase.
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4 Conclusion
The presented article demonstrates the inefficiency of login and password
change phase of Lee’s schemes in identifying incorrect input. The study
shows that flaw in password change phase leads to denial of service attack.
Moreover, the study shows that Lee’s scheme fails to resist password guessing
attack.
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